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Abstract:
Aim: The aim of this article is to highlight potential methods applicable to a standard forensic approach for the analysis of
high-resolution satellite imagery that may contain evidence of alleged mass atrocities.
Methods: The primary method employed is the retrospective analysis of a case study involving the use of high-resolution
satellite imagery analysis to document alleged mass atrocities. The case study utilized herein is the Satellite Sentinel Project’s
reporting on the May 2011 sacking of Abyei Town by Government of Sudan-aligned armed actors. In the brief case study,
categories of objects, patterns of activities, and types of alleged mass atrocity events are applied the Abyei Town incident.
Results: Categories of activity patterns, visible phenomena, and relevant objects leaned from the Abyei Town case study may provide
a scalable example of how accepted forensic standards for remote sensing analysis of alleged mass atrocities may be further developed.
Conclusions: The methods and frameworks applied in this research to the Abyei Town case study should be tested and refined
through further case studies. The sources of these case studies may be both past reports by civil society, governments, and
international judicial bodies and new analyses of previously unanalyzed high-resolution satellite imagery of alleged mass atrocities.
Keywords: satellite, imagery, forensic science, pedagogy, mass atrocities, human rights, remote sensing, Sudan, war crimes, analysis

MARS: The Application of Remote Sensing to Mass Atrocity Contexts
Prior to the United States Government allowing the commercial sale of high-resolution satellite imagery
in the early 1990’s, high-spatial resolution1 (afterwards, “high-resolution”) satellite imagery was almost solely
available only to governments, their militaries, and their intelligence agencies.2 This change in policy has
enabled NGOs and international agencies to begin employing this specific type of remote sensing technology
to document alleged mass atrocity events.3
The use of high-resolution satellite imagery analysis to document mass atrocity events, which is referred
to hereafter as Mass Atrocity Remote Sensing (MARS), has demonstrated utility for these groups.4 Remote
sensing can provide unique, sometimes otherwise unavailable, information about events occurring in extremely
non-permissive environments,5 over large geographic areas, and across long and multiple timeframes.
Regions where mass atrocity events occur are typically inaccessible to outside observers, particularly civil
society groups and international agencies.
There are several distinct applications for MARS involving the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery,
including retrospective documentation of events for accountability and advocacy purposes;6 detection of
potential indicators that a mass atrocity may soon occur;7 and as a data source for researching historical activity
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patterns that may occur during certain armed conflicts.8 Some advocacy organizations currently employing
MARS to document specific types of mass atrocities include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
the Enough Project, and Physicians for Human Rights. Reports released by these organizations have focused
on nations that include Syria, Sudan, Nigeria, Burma, and Central African Republic.9
Academic research institutions also conduct high-resolution satellite imagery analysis of alleged atrocity
events, and their research has helped support the adoption of these tools and methods by civil society groups.
Notable examples of these types of research centers include the American Association for the Advancement
of Science’s (AAAS) Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project10 and the Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative’s (HHI) Signal Program on Human Security and Technology.11
International agencies and governments are involved in this type of work as well. The United Nations
Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) is a leading example of the increased use of remote
sensing by international agencies in potential mass atrocity producing contexts.12 UNOSAT has provided
analysis of imagery, generated maps, and created other products related to the mass displacement of civilian
populations in South Sudan, Syria, and elsewhere.13 Recently, the United States Department of State’s
Humanitarian Information Unit has started releasing commercial imagery of alleged mass atrocity events to
voluntary technical organizations, NGOs, and other civil society groups.14 Examples of MARS-relevant data
released so far by the US State Department through this initiative include commercial imagery captured over
Syria, among other locations, where armed conflict is ongoing.15
Additionally, intelligence services and other executive agencies of various national governments, including
the European Union16 and the United States’ intelligence community, are increasingly expressing public interest
in improving mass atrocity Early Warning Early Response (EWER) capabilities.17 The full scope of the interest
and investment of these agencies in MARS applications, however, is difficult to fully assess, in part, due to the
classified nature of some of these activities.
In the past approximately twenty years, MARS-type analyses of high-resolution remote sensing data, including
aerial reconnaissance photography, have been admitted as evidence in cases before the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), amongst other national and international venues.18 However, it can be argued that civil society’s
use of high-resolution remote sensing specific to the mass atrocity context is still very much a recent development.
The MARS Methodology Gap
Despite the growing number of organizations engaged in this space, little formal pedagogy specific to
this emerging field exists. Thus, efforts to professionalize and standardize the application of remote sensing in
the context of mass atrocities has lagged behind the pace at which organizations are adopting this technology
for these purposes. Analysts using these technologies have little documented past practice to draw upon.
The net result is that MARS practitioners are currently without accepted forensic standards specific to
corroborating through primarily remotely observed phenomena whether an alleged mass atrocity has likely
occurred.19 This core gap is the result, in part, of little extant research intentionally treating MARS as its own
distinct discipline within remote sensing, with its own distinct operational challenges and requirements.
As a consequence, MARS appears to most often be applied by organizations to create incident specific
analysis products. These products may aim to enhance current situational awareness or support advocacy
efforts to shift public opinion and policy around a particular issue.20 Few current MARS products, however,
appear specifically intended to create generalizable knowledge leading to the development of standard
methodologies for applying MARS across incidental and regional contexts.
Some analysis techniques originally developed for military intelligence purposes (known as “geospatial
intelligence” or “GEOINT”) that are relevant to MARS work can sometimes be gleaned from both unclassified
and declassified United States Government imagery and analysis products.21 While of general value to the
MARS field, past GEOINT practices alone are not enough of an antecedent to develop standard theoretical
and methodological approaches to MARS work.
Publicly available GEOINT examples rarely include previous analyses of mass atrocity incidents. A
notable exception is declassified satellite imagery and aerial reconnaissance photography related to the 1995
Srebrenica massacre. This imagery was later released after it was used as evidence exhibits in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.22 The Srebrenica images are unique in this regard.
Original, cross contextual MARS-specific research will thus be required if analysts are to learn what
potentially observable objects and corresponding activity patterns involving those objects may be detectable
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through remote sensing. Additionally, this research should seek to understand the unique identifiable
characteristics of activity patterns that may generally occur during mass atrocity events within certain regions
(i.e., East Africa, Middle East, North Africa, etc.) and environments (i.e., desert, savannah, mountains, urban
settings, etc.). Research should prioritize geographic areas and contexts where past experience demonstrates
mass atrocity events are more likelyto occur.23
A New Forensics of Remotely Observed Objects and Activity Patterns
MARS-relevant patterns should be based upon certain repeating observable objects (i.e., military
vehicles, newly razed buildings, shell craters, etc.) and phenomena involving these objects and features
(i.e., apparent troop movements, infrastructure construction patterns, indiscriminate bombardment, civilian
displacement, house-to-house searches, etc.) found in some form across these contexts and regions. These
observable objects and phenomena may be visible either prior to a mass atrocity event occurring, during
the alleged perpetration of a mass atrocity event by armed actors, or as a result of changes to objects and the
surrounding physical environment after a mass atrocity event has allegedly occurred.
This task is complicated, though, by the fact that the remote collection of evidence from alleged mass
scale crimes requires its own unique set of criminalistics (i.e., scientific methods for collecting and analyzing
evidence). Currently, there are no established criminalistics for MARS.24 The establishment of criminalistics
for MARS will likely be based on indicators and phenomena that have few antecedents in both traditional
criminal forensics and what can be learned from non-classified examples of GEOINT.
The lack of previous antecedents for this type of forensic analysis is partly due to the fact that MARS
practitioners analyze events occurring within areas of interest (AOI) that can encompass several thousand square
kilometers and across timeframes spanning several days, months, or even years. Thus, a new discipline of remote
forensic analysis specific to the evolving MARS field must be developed from the integration of several sources
of past practice. These sources of applicable past practice may include, though are not limited to, the following
fields: Remote sensing analysis of environmental factors, photogrammetry, crime scene investigation by law
enforcement agencies, and military and intelligence approaches to geospatial intelligence collection and analysis.
To develop a forensic science tailored to support MARS applications, a common approach for identifying
and classifying examples of activity patterns comprised of certain observable objects with potential probative
value should be identified, tested, and subjected to peer review. This approach should draw on the growing
body of public, incident specific reports, like those mentioned above, that are being generated in recent years
by NGOs, academic researchers, and international agencies.
In time, legal standards of what constitutes potential evidence of specific mass atrocities could likely be
cross-referenced and integrated with these case studies for the purposes of identifying and agreeing evidence
examples. Eventually, best practices for MARS evidence collection, annotation, and storage may be able to be
developed from that resulting corpus of evidence examples.
This paper, however, solely addresses only one of the methodological and pedagogical gaps mentioned
above. That gap is the absence of a standard approach for the classification of phenomena involving observable
objects into categories of activity patterns relevant to certain mass atrocity events.
The analysis of one case study—the alleged May 2011 razing of Abyei town by Sudan Armed Forces—
is examined within this article. The case study data is derived from the reports of the Satellite Sentinel
Project25 and the HHI Signal Program study, “Sudan: Anatomy of a Conflict.”26 The goal of the case study is to
demonstrate a potential framework for approaching the challenge of standard identification and classification
of MARS-related activity patterns and observable objects.
Though specific to objects and patterns common to the context of armed conflict in East Africa, the authors
intend for the framework to be of broader value outside Sudan and similar nations. It is expected that this initial
approach may likely have some relevance for MARS practitioners conducting analyses of alleged mass atrocities
across diverse regional and operational contexts. Other similar case studies from different regions, timeframes,
and/or operational contexts may aid in refining and scaling this evolving methodology for general use.
Case Study: The Alleged May 2011 Razing of Abyei Town by Government of Sudan-Aligned Forces
In January 2011, the people of the nation that is now South Sudan voted in a referendum to overwhelmingly
secede from Sudan. A bloody, decades long civil war between Sudan and southern Sudan ended with the signing of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The accord provided an opportunity for the southern part of
the nation to vote on self-determination.27 In July 2011, South Sudan officially became the world’s newest nation.
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Figure 1. Map of the Abyei Administrative Area.
However, the CPA did not resolve the final status of the Abyei Administrative Area, a region straddling a
long-contested border area between Sudan and South Sudan. Thus, at the time of the January 2011 referendum,
Abyei residents technically belonged to both West Kordofan state, Sudan and Bahr-el-Ghazal, a state in what
is now South Sudan.28
The majority of Abyei’s population is from the Ngok Dinka, a southern Sudan-aligned ethnic group,
who inhabit the region’s largest city, Abyei Town, as well as most of the area immediately surrounding it. The
second largest ethnic group present the region is the Misseriya, an Arab ethnic group traditionally aligned
with Sudan. The Misseriya, semi-nomadic pastoralists, move seasonally into the Abyei region to graze their
cattle via a series of traditional migration routes, known as murhals.29
A referendum to resolve the status of the Abyei region was originally scheduled for around the same time
as the vote to decide the future of southern Sudan. Ordered by a decision from the Hague-based Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2009, the referendum was intended to peacefully resolve the tensions between
Sudan and the then southern Sudanese.30
However, the PCA decision was not implemented due to disputes over Sudan’s insistence that the Misseriya,
who are seasonal residents, be allowed to vote in the referendum.31 Towards the end of 2010 and in the spring
of 2011, clashes broke out between the Misseriya and southern Sudanese-aligned forces inside the Abyei region,
leading to the destruction of villages and the forced displacement of primarily Ngok Dinka civilians.32
Forces aligned with both Sudan and southern Sudan took up positions inside the Abyei region,
constructing fortifications and hardening their emplacements. It was during this time that Sudanese regular
forces, in addition to Misseriya militias apparently already operating within Abyei, began to build-up their
strength at bases inside Sudanese territory. These tanks, planes, infantry, and other units were arrayed within
air and ground strike range of Abyei Town.33
The tense situation, which had been punctuated for months by seemingly isolated incidents of violence,
devolved into an all-out invasion of Abyei Town by Sudanese forces. Following a shootout between Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) at the Dokura checkpoint on the night
of May 19, 2011, SAF engaged in artillery bombardment of SPLA positions at Todach and Tajalei, areas to the
north of Abyei Town proper on May 20.34
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By the end of the next day, May 21, Abyei Town was firmly in the control of SAF-aligned forces.
Over 30,000 residents of the town had fled. Houses were on fire. Misseriya militia and SAF forces allegedly
moved freely throughout Abyei Town, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers, looting and burning civilian
property on a large scale.35
Over the next few days, more than a third of all standing structures in Abyei Town were razed, the
World Food Programme compound was looted, and the central market was destroyed.36 Four senior former
prosecutors and US State Department war crimes officials would later determine that the actions of SAFaligned forces during the Abyei Town incident potentially rose to the level of war crimes.37
Categories of Observable Objects Likely Relevant to the May 2011 Abyei Incident
The following observable objects, or “observables”, may often be observed using remotely sensed
imagery in the context of other rural and semi-urban East African armed conflict settings, including
the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan.38 The 2011 razing of Abyei Town in the disputed Abyei Region
bordering Sudan and South Sudan, the case study in this article, falls within this specific context. Some
likely techniques a MARS analyst would employ to identify (or “type”) these observables are included for
each category of object as well.
The table below is based on data solely from the Signal Program for Human Security and Technology
at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s (HHI) 2013 satellite imagery-based study, Sudan: Anatomy of a
Conflict. It is specific to that study’s section on the alleged May 2011 razing of Abyei Town by Government of
Sudan-aligned forces (GoS).39
While these observables are common in multiple East African MARS settings, the table is not meant to
be exhaustive, nor are all examples inclusive to the context of the Abyei Town incident.40 The table is intended
to both serve as a practice example of a MARS specific observable object and typing chart, as well as a resource
to inform the interpretation of imagery examples later in the case study.
Table 1. MARS-Relevant Observables and Corresponding Typing Methods (Alleged Razing of Abyei Town
by Sudan-Aligned Forces, May 2011)
MARS-Relevant Observables

Typing Methods

VEHICLES:
● Military-use ground vehicles (i.e., tanks,
armored personnel carriers, heavy transport
trucks, water and fuel tankers, etc.)
● Civilian-use ground vehicles (i.e., Land
cruisers, lorries, etc.)
○ NGO/UN branded vehicles
○ Fuel, water transport tankers
○ Livestock transport vehicles
○ Earthmovers (i.e., backhoes and road
graders)

● Dimensions, color patterns, and unique features

AIRCRAFT:
● Fixed wing (i.e., fighter jets, transport planes,
bombers, etc.)
● Rotary wing (i.e., attack helicopters, transport
helicopters, etc.)

● DCU Comparison.
● OOC Analysis.
● Measurement of runway length to help

ARTILLERY:
● Towed artillery (i.e., Howitzers, other large
caliber ordnance that can be pulled behind a
vehicle)
● Mechanized tube artillery (i.e., multiple
launch rocket systems, etc.)
● Fixed artillery (i.e., large, long-range weapons
that are not mobile)

● DCU Comparison.
● Presence of “V” shape at back of long, gun-

©2014

of an object can be compared with publicly
available databases, such as Jane’s reference
materials (hereafter, “DCU comparison”).
● Observable Object Context Analysis (hereafter,
“OOC Analysis”): The context in which specific
observable objects repeatedly appear can often
help indicate their identity and/or current
use (i.e., Presence of white, uniformly shaped
vehicles at a known hospital may likely be
ambulances, etc.).

determine minimum takeoff and landing
requirements for aircraft present.

shaped weapon consistent with towed artillery.

● Object placement in circular depression (also
called an “artillery berm”).

● Position of “gun barrel” feature on the object
changes over time.
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MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE:
● Permanent encampments (i.e., major bases,
including unit headquarters, containing more
permanent buildings and infrastructure)
● Temporary encampments (i.e., forward
operating bases created as part of operations,
fortifications, groups of tents, etc.)
● Air bases (i.e., airstrips, aprons, hangars,
logistical support buildings and equipment,
fuel tanks, air traffic control, and
communications towers, etc.)

● Presence of external and/or internal security

CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE:
● Civilian dwellings
○ Tukuls (traditional huts)
○ Metal roof structures
● Water points (including catchment basins,
boreholes, water towers/tanks)
● Agriculture
○ Fields
○ Orchards
○ Irrigation infrastructure
● Markets
● Religious sites
○ Mosques
○ Churches
● Hospitals/clinics, schools

● Tukuls: Circular mud and thatch structures

●
●
●
●

●

●
●
●
●

●

perimeters comprised of trenches, berms,
checkpoints, guard towers, fences, wooden
corrals, or fighting positions (“foxholes”).
OOC analysis of military vehicles in and
around structures, perimeters, etc.
Visible communications infrastructure,
including radio towers, satellite dishes, etc.
Potential housing, supply and logistics
buildings (i.e., barracks, motor pools, ammo
dumps, external water and fuel tanks, etc.).
Tents of various shapes, colors, sizes, and
arrangements.

with cone shaped roofs, often surrounded
by a some form of corral or other enclosure
composed of brush.
Non-tukul structures consistent with civilian
dwellings: Square/rectangular buildings with
reflective roofs, presence of corrals, walls, or
other enclosures.
Water points, etc.: Gathering of animals,
crowds around standing water, enclosure with
large basin or pump house, etc.
Agriculture: Visible evidence of cultivation,
presence of nearby trenching (i.e., possible
irrigation), trees arrayed in rows, etc.
Market: Presence of irregular stalls with metal,
tarp, and/or fabric roofs; livestock holding
areas; gathering of vehicles.
Religious sites: Mosques may or may not have
visible minaret structures present, dome, or
Mecca-facing orientation. Churches may or
may not have visible steeples. In both cases,
non-imagery data corroboration is required.
Hospitals/clinics, schools: These and other
similar structures require non-imagery data
corroboration. Though features present in
imagery may support identification, none
of these features are usually dispositive by
themselves.

HUMANITARIAN INFRASTRUCTURE:
Humanitarian compounds and/or displaced persons
● Humanitarian agency compounds
camps may be characterized by some or all of the
○ Warehouses
following features:
○ Administrative Buildings/Tents
● Presence of uniform colored vehicles (usually
○ Motor pools
white Land Cruiser-type).
● Displaced persons camps
● Uniform or similar shaped temporary
○ Tents
structures (i.e., tents) with agency logos
○ Water and Sanitation infrastructure
sometimes visible on roof.
○ NGO/UN vehicles
● Large numbers of tarp and/or stick based
○ IDP/Refugee built housing (i.e., tarp and/
structures (with or without corrals).
or stick huts)
● Apparent WASH (Water, Sanitation, and
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Hygiene) infrastructure (either stockpiled
or deployed), including tanker vehicles,
washrooms/shower houses, water storage
vessels, etc.
● Helipad and/or airstrip with white painted
fixed wing transport, rotary, or other aircraft.
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
● Roads
● Bridges
● Bus stations/transit centers

● Roads: Presenting as dirt tracks, surfaced (i.e.,

paved) roads, or as elevated dirt tracks (i.e.,
roads built-up out of compressed earth).
● Bridges: Can be concrete or metal structures
present over rivers.
● Bus stations/transit centers: Characterized by
the routine presence of buses, transport vehicles,
often located in towns/cities of larger size.

Primary Imagery Analysis Methods for Identifying Mass Atrocity-Related Activity Patterns
MARS analysts may use multiple accepted remote sensing analysis methods, either individually or
in combination, to identify observable objects and apparent patterns of activity involving those objects.
Of particular importance to the MARS analyst is the observation of changes to the physical environment over
time. These observations can occur based on the analysis of one or more satellite images of one or more AOIs
over a timeframe of days, months, or years.
Analysts attempt to draw probabilistic inferences about the potential causal and/or correlative
relationships between the absence, presence, or change in position of observable objects and changes to the
physical environment of an area. Three methods, in particular, are useful for analyzing activity patterns and
attempting to understand their significance:
• Multi-temporal Change Detection: Multi-temporal change detection involves the comparison of
two or more images of the same area captured at different times.41 The analyst will attempt to
detect differences in the coloration, visual properties, presence, absence, and/or position of objects
across the images, drawing inferences from those changes. This analysis is often performed with
the support of imagery analysis software, such as ERDAS Imagine or other computer programs.42
• Multispectral Analysis: Multispectral images are satellite images that capture more than one
wavelength (or band) of electromagnetic energy.43 A commonly used multispectral band is nearinfrared (NIR), which is most often used for detecting changes to vegetation, especially ground
cover, in a satellite image.44 This approach is especially helpful in seeing vehicle tracks, such as
tank or tire tread marks.
• Non-imagery Data Cross-Referencing: Whenever possible, imagery is cross-referenced with nonimagery data to help identify observables, provide context to their behavior and disposition, or to
help identify the potential AOI itself. Non-imagery data may include history of past conflict, the
affiliation of armed actors, and relationships between ethnic or religious groups. There are many
sources of non-imagery data in MARS contexts that may be cross-referenced with imagery. Some
of the most common include news articles, reports from NGOs and international agencies, such
as the UN, crowd sourced map data, and even the public statements of the alleged perpetrators
themselves. It is optimal for MARS analysts to structure their collection of non-imagery data by
its spatio-temporal metadata (i.e., place and time information common to each report) to more
effectively integrate these streams with remote sensing data.
Factors Affecting the Identification of Objects and Activity Patterns
The analysis of remote sensing data of an object alone does not allow an analyst to scientifically reach
a level of absolute certainty as to the definitive identity of that object, nor to the nature of its status and/or
activity at the time the image was captured. An object or phenomenon present in remote sensing data can,
at most, only be “consistent with” the known visual properties that object is believed to have when apparently
visible in a satellite image.45
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Thus, identifying MARS-related objects (and the activity patterns which they comprise) to the highest
level of probabilistic certainty possible depends, in large part, on three interdependent sets of factors. These
factors can affect—both negatively and positively—the degree to which an analyst can reach the highest level
of probabilistic certainty possible:
A) Available Data: The volume, quality, and potential relevance of both imagery and non-imagery
data available to the MARS practitioner related to the area of interest required to identify the
presence of the visual properties consistent with these objects and patterns;
B) Technology: Certain MARS-relevant objects and patterns may or may not be detected through
available remote sensing technologies and analysis methodologies across any or all operational
contexts and situations;
C) Relevance: An analyst’s understanding of what objects and patterns are potentially relevant to
MARS analysis, including the visual characteristics and properties of the objects comprising
those patterns.
First, it is the interplay of these three sets of factors that often determine what observable objects present in
imagery an analyst may be able to reliably identify. Second, the interaction of these factors also help determine
what inferences and insights about the potential activity of those objects an analyst may be able to draw.
Lastly, these factors also impact the degree to which a MARS analyst may or may not be able to connect
any apparent activity patterns to any specific types of alleged mass atrocities that may be detectable through
remote sensing. To assess and mitigate how these factors may affect the quality and accuracy of analysis,
analysts should be fluent in the basic technical capabilities and expected limitations of publicly available
remote sensing technologies.
Limitations of Remote Sensing Technologies
Until June 2014, the highest resolution of publicly available (i.e., non-classified) satellite imagery
accessible to civilian actors is approximately 50 centimeters.46 At this resolution, analysts can expect to
reliably identify, or “type”, certain categories of commonly repeating objects the size of vehicles, buildings,
and major infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, through satellite imagery analysis. Crowds of
livestock and people can sometimes be visible, though the exact composition, size, and object type of
these crowd configurations cannot be reliably determined. Additionally, “micro interactions”, such as
the movement of small groups of individuals and the positioning of small weapons, cannot be reliably
identified and tracked.
However, it must be noted, that both the quality of imagery, the number of recent and/or relevant
images of an AOI available (known as “temporal resolution”),47 and the level of corroborating non-imagery
data available to the MARS analyst are dynamics that may also determine whether an observable object
can be typed. Multiple factors outside of the analyst’s control determine the overall quality of a highresolution satellite image.
These factors may include, though are not limited to, the angle at which the satellite was positioned when
the image was captured (known as “off-nadir angle”);48 the position of the sun overhead at the time of the
image (known as “solar azimuth angle”);49 the presence of clouds, smoke or other particulate matter in the air
at the time the image was taken; and the degree to which seasonal variables effect the presence of trees, ground
cover vegetation, and other flora that may obscure objects present in the image.50
Cross-referencing imagery with all available potentially relevant non-imagery data is necessary.
Corroborating analytic conclusions about objects and other phenomena present in an image rarely can occur
based on imagery alone. Some of these sources of non-imagery data useful for corroboration of imagery
analysis can include eyewitness testimony, news articles and other open source reports from NGOs.
Data with probative value for MARS analysis may also be gleaned from ethnographic studies of
populations present within the AOI. Past studies of regionally and culturally specific macro trends related to
armed conflicts, economic development, and population movements may also be of value.
One of the defining features of MARS analysis is its inherently interdisciplinary nature, as the diverse
sets of factors listed above demonstrate. Thus, practitioners are often faced with a heterogeneous mixture of
potentially relevant data, often in several languages. These diverse streams of data may require simultaneous
application of multiple mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze them.
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Additionally, predictable situational variables across regional, operational, and environmental contexts
of MARS analysis must also be taken into account. Identifying these variables can help analysts anticipate
and acquire the potential sources of imagery and non-imagery data that may be required to apply MARS to
a specific regional context.
Repeating Situational Variables Across MARS Contexts
Each potential MARS context is shaped by its own particular set of dynamic variables. However, most of
these variables can be isolated into distinct categories and anticipated to some degree. Categories of situational
variables repeating across MARS contexts may include the following:
• Natural Environment: Climate type and seasonal variations can affect MARS analysis
significantly. Deserts, for example, have higher visibility than jungles due to having little to no
tree canopy. Additionally, regionally specific rainy seasons can cause major changes in ground
vegetation, and their corresponding cloud cover may severely restrict the use of space-based
sensors during that period;
• Civilian Disposition: Assessing the disposition of civilian populations that are potential targets
of alleged mass atrocities is a critical consideration. These dispositions can include sedentary
agrarian, urban industrial, semi-nomadic, or fully nomadic pastoralist. In some cases, multiple
dispositions can be found within one geographic area or ethnic group;
• Civilian Livelihoods: Understanding how different civilian populations with different dispositions
support themselves is key to evaluating if they have been targeted for attack. Contextually specific
observable objects may be likely indicators of intentional attacks against that population. For
example, agrarian civilian populations that cultivate crops may have those crops intentionally
burned if attacked. Apprehending these likely indicators helps analysts identify potential activity
patterns consistent with specific types of mass atrocity events (i.e., indiscriminate bombardment,
forced displacement, destruction and looting of civilian property, etc.);
• Armed Actors: Potential armed actors present in MARS contexts can vary significantly across
scenarios. Often, multiple force types are present at once. There are two primary categories for the
varying force types of armed actors: Regular and irregular. Regular forces are the standing military
and/or security services of a nation state. Irregular forces are not members of organized military
or security services, and can include rebel groups, militias, mercenaries, mobs, paramilitary
forces, and other non-state fighters.
• Force Profile: Conducting an assessment of the mean (or baseline) military capability of both
regular and irregular forces specific to a MARS context is critical for building a force profile of
different armed actors. A force profile of each armed actor in a MARS context is important to
have for two reasons. First, understanding the unique capabilities of one force versus another
provides important circumstantial data that helps differentiate what unit may have perpetrated
an alleged mass atrocity event. For example, tanks appear in a recently attacked village that had
been previously controlled by a force that does not possess tanks. An analyst may be able to
more fully corroborate the identity of the attackers if they can show that the force hostile to
that village’s population is known to have those particular types of tanks in its arsenal. Secondly,
understanding the force profile for each force helps analysts identify units consistent with the
capabilities of that force in the field. For example, an analyst can use his or her assessment of
the mean military capability of a force to attempt to track the movements of observable objects
consistent with that assessment over time.
Inferred Observable Object Activity Patterns and Evidence of Alleged Perpetrator Actions
In the table below, three apparent categories of actions by GoS-aligned forces, the alleged perpetrators
of the May 2011 attack on Abyei Town, are broken down across four categories. These categories are based
on the observable objects outlined in the table above, their apparent activity patterns, unique phenomena
that helps corroborate the perpetrator’s apparent action, and the analysis methods that could likely be used to
interpret the imagery data.
Previously analyzed DigitalGlobe imagery by HHI’s Signal Program provides examples of each of the
three alleged perpetrator actions. Additionally, explanatory notes, based on the HHI study, Sudan Anatomy
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of a Conflict, are included to explicate the analytic process apparently employed. Each imagery example has
the number of the relevant alleged perpetrator action that appears to have occurred.
Table 2. MARS Indicators and Activity Patterns Consistent with Alleged Perpetrator Actions (Alleged
Razing of Abyei Town by Sudan-Aligned Forces, May 2011)
Alleged Perpetrator
Action
1. Apparent
Intentional
Targeting of
Civilian Populations
and Forced
Displacement

Observable Object
Indicators
Destroyed
structures
consistent with
civilian dwellings,
civilian-use
facilities.

Apparent Activity
Patterns
Dismounted actors
(i.e., on foot) moved
building to building
burning and/or
breaking apart
structures.

Unique Corroborating
Phenomena
Absence of ground
burn pattern between
the razed structures
is consistent
with intentional
destruction of
buildings.

Analysis Methods

Primary: Multitemporal change
detection.
Secondary: Nonimagery data crossreference for reports
of attacks and
displacement.
2. Apparent
Irregular shaped
Dismounted actors The sudden
Primary: MultiTargeting of
objects consistent haphazardly moved appearance of piles of temporal change
Humanitarian
with debris
and ransacked items items, humanitarian detection.
Facilities, Looting appears in vicinity originally within the goods (i.e., food
of Civilian Property of structures
structures outside sacks, etc.), and other Secondary: Nonand Humanitarian consistent with
of the structures.
unknown objects in imagery data cross
Supplies
civilian-use/
Often this results in an area known to
referencing and
humanitarian
the division of items have been recently
object typing of any
agency
amongst a group of assaulted by an armed uniform objects,
infrastructure.
alleged perpetrators, force. Additionally, particularly UN or
Buildings may be sometimes as
presence of irregular ICRC (International
either razed or still payment for their
objects in transport Committee of the
appear intact.
actions.
vehicles moving away Red Cross) standard
from area towards
use items, such as
friendly territory may food sacks; crossbe consistent with
reference reports of
looting.
attacks.
3. Apparent Forcible Observable objects Rapid movement
Sudden appearance of Primary: MultiMilitary Control of are dependent on of mixed vehicles
multiple observable
temporal change
Area (i.e., Invasion force profile of
into an area, which objects consistent
detection;
by Hostile Actor)
suspected aggressor may or may not
with the known force Observable object
force. These objects include either fire
profile of an armed
context (OOC)
may include, heavy support operations actor in an area that
analysis; and
armor vehicles
by air assets and/or they previously did
dimensions, color
(i.e., tanks), light artillery. Forces also not control. Analysts patterns, and unique
armor vehicles (i.e., likely engaged in
should expect to see features (DCU)
APCs, armored
operations to secure vehicle track patterns analysis.
cars, etc.), artillery, area and conduct
on and around main
Land Cruisersearches, resulting in roads, cratering, and Secondary: Nontype vehicles,
checkpoints, vehicle other evidence of
imagery data crossand/or evidence
patrols on side
combat operations.
referencing reports
of dismounted
streets, etc.
Other activity patterns of force movement.
units (i.e., tents,
consistent with other
crowds assembled
alleged perpetrator acts
in formations,
are likely occurring
checkpoints).
at this time (i.e.,
looting, destruction of
building, etc.).
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Imagery captured on 26 May 2011 (Figure 2), soon after the Government of Sudan-aligned forces’
invasion into Abyei Town, shows evidence consistent with the majority of the main market area having
been burned. The activity pattern is characterized in part by the lack of scorch marks between many of the
buildings. The apparent trend of burned structures with uniform gaps in the scorched earth between groups
of them is consistent with the intentional destruction of this area by likely dismounted forces. This pattern of
destruction was further corroborated by publicly released ground photographs taken during that time51 and
by a UN report.52

11 February 2011. QuickBird-2 satellite.
26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.
Figure 2. Apparent Intentional Destruction of Civilian Property, Targeting of Civilian Populations, and
Forced Displacement. (Alleged Perpetrator Actions 1 and 2). Images courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
Approximately 30 percent of Abyei Town’s apparent civilian dwellings, many of them tukuls, traditional
circular mud and thatch huts, appear to have been razed during the invasion.53 The lack of scorched
earth between the tukuls and other apparent civilian structures is indicative of intentional burning by
dismounted forces (Figure 2.1).

26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.
Figure 2.1. Intentional Targeting of Civilian Populations and Forced Displacement.
(Alleged Perpetrator Action 1). Image courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
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This image shows the World Food Programme’s storage facility, located in central Abyei Town (Figure 2.2).
In the image captured after the SAF invasion, two tent-like structures are no longer visible and shelves appear
overturned in the center of the facility. Activity consistent with looting can be corroborated based on both the
regular shaped objects consistent with WFP-size grain sacks, as well as the irregular-shaped objects consistent
with unknown debris, present in the streets and loaded on to vehicles in close proximity to the facility. UN
reports confirm the looting of 800 metric tons of food and medical supplies from the facility.54

11 February 2011. QuickBird-2 satellite.

26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.

Figure 2.2. Apparent Targeting of Humanitarian Actors and Looting of Humanitarian
Supplies. (Alleged Perpetrator Action 2). Images courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
During the invasion, imagery revealed the presence of armored vehicles and towed artillery consistent
with units known to be employed by SAF. The above image shows three T-55 main battle tanks loaded onto
heavy equipment transports (HETs), as well as four additional T-55’s off-loaded and facing southward.55
Also facing southward are three pieces of unhitched 105mm artillery guns and an armored infantry-fighting
vehicle, also consistent with the SAF force profile (Figure 2.3).
The positioning of the artillery in a southward direction, toward southern Sudan, is dispositive forensic
evidence that those observables are likely controlled by SAF at the time the image was captured. At that time,
SAF troops were reportedly moving due south at that time towards SPLA positions along the River Kiir.56 The
artillery appears to be facing in that vector to provide fire support, if needed, in the direction of the SPLA
frontline.

26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.
Figure 2.3 Apparent Forcible Military Control of an Area. (Alleged Perpetrator Action 3). Image
courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
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Suggestions for Further Research
As the Abyei Town incident case study is intended to demonstrate, MARS analysis can be approached in
a systematic and standardized way that relies on the iterative comparison of accepted examples of past practice
over time. The approaches articulated herein should be studied and built upon through further research that
will require the committed involvement of expertise and resources from a diverse community of entities.
These actors may include academic institutions, human rights and humanitarian NGOs, international legal
experts and bodies, governments, private business, and most importantly, the communities affected by mass
atrocities themselves.
If such research is pursued, MARS may eventually have a place in mass atrocity investigations as its own
formalized profession. As a result, MARS may be able to play a similar to the role that DNA analysis, ballistics,
forensic anthropology, or any number of traditional forensic sciences currently play in multiple domestic and
international criminal justice settings.
Examples of best practices should be both identified and created where required. This effort should
occur across various mass atrocity contexts, geographic regions, and operational objectives (i.e., collection of
evidence for accountability versus early warning, etc.) for MARS to become a truly scalable tool.
Component pieces that may eventually provide a common forensic methodology for MARS should
include, though are not limited to, the following:
• A common approach for the standard identification of potentially relevant observable objects,
likely visual properties and/or phenomena associated with those objects, and tested methods to
aid in their identification;
• Accepted methods for the identification and testing of apparent activity patterns to determine
whether they are consistent with an alleged mass atrocity event type and/or alleged perpetrator
action;
• The creation of a common, publicly accessible repository for MARS evidence examples to be
presented and critiqued by practitioners. Such an evidence repository may also require the
agreement of an annotation method, taxonomy, and presentation guidelines for collecting and
storing these examples that should be common to the field;
• Development of common standards for creating, field testing, and evaluating algorithmic feature
extraction applications for the automated identification of MARS related phenomena in imagery.
The continuing development of algorithmic feature extraction programs presents potential
challenges and opportunities for the MARS space that will have to be assessed;
• Research into how remote sensing in mass atrocity contexts may either protect or endanger
vulnerable populations or physical evidence on-the-ground, particularly human remains found in
mass graves. Related inquiry should occur into determining whether remote surveillance of alleged
perpetrators has any causal relationship to changes in the behavior of these actors in any way;
• The integration and cross-referencing of international humanitarian and human rights law
(IHHRL) standards, particularly the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute, with MARS
examples of forensic evidence. This research effort may require interdisciplinary collaboration
between the MARS community and IHHRL experts to develop a common reference for forensic
examples of alleged war crimes, including genocide.
Significant challenges, however, will have to be overcome to further develop, agree upon, and disseminate
a forensic science specific to MARS. The difficulty in accessing sources of geospatial data of alleged mass
atrocity acts and related operational patterns has plagued the field for some time. The often exorbitant cost
of high-resolution satellite imagery, as well as a limited number of high-resolution satellites available to
proactively task, have been major barriers to the advancement of this field.
Innovations to remote sensing, including the deployment of “micro-satellites”, which are often less
costly to build, maintain and replace, may offer potential remedies to some of these longstanding barriers to
affordable, recently acquired data.57
However, new, less costly technologies alone may likely not be enough to support the evolution of this
subfield of remote sensing into an established forensic science. Proportionate investment in the agreement of
common standards, methods, evidence examples, and the training and development of practitioners is also
simultaneously required.
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Remote sensing offers potentially powerful insights into the alleged mass atrocities perpetrators commit
in some of the world’s most inaccessible environments. It is incumbent upon researchers and practitioners
of MARS to begin the difficult yet necessary process of becoming more than simply one application of this
technology, but instead, a constant process of scientific innovation.
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